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ABSTRACT: This is an experimental study of a three-player power-to-take game where a 
proposer is matched with two responders. We compare a treatment in which subjects are 
anonymous to each other (strangers) with one in which responders know each other from 
outside the lab (friends). We focus on the responders’ decisions, beliefs, and emotions. We 
find that friends punish the proposer more than strangers, and that they are more likely to 
coordinate their punishment (without communication). Both punishment and coordination are 
explained by the responders’ emotional reactions. Furthermore, the responders’ expectations 
are better predictors of emotions and destruction than their fairness perceptions. 
 
 
                                                 
* A previous version of this paper circulated under the title “Reciprocity and emotions when 
reciprocators know each other”. We are thankful for feedback from participants at the Public Choice 
Society meeting in Baltimore, the ESA meeting in Amsterdam, and the Tilburg Symposium on 
Psychology and Economics. 
1. Introduction 
Over the last decade, various papers have emphasized the importance of emotions in 
decision making (e.g. Elster, 1998; Loewenstein, 2000). Emotions may help us 
explain behavior that is hard to reconcile with existing economic models. For 
example, Fehr and Gächter (2002) mention emotions as a possible explanation of non-
strategic punishment in public good settings. If this were the case, emotion research 
could then be helpful in improving our understanding of the circumstances facilitating 
cooperation in social dilemma settings. Other studies have focused on the effects of 
emotions on preferences (Hirshleifer, 1987; Loewenstein, 1996), the value of 
emotions as producers of reliable signals (Frank, 1987), the use of emotions as way of 
harnessing political support (Glaeser, 2005), and emotional hazard as a source of 
efficiency losses (van Winden, 2001). Others have proposed adaptations of utility 
functions reflecting emotions. For example, Erard and Feinstein (1994) assume that 
tax evasion causes disutility because of shame or guilt. Fehr and Schmidt (2000), in 
discussing the inequality aversion model, argue that individuals experience a disutility 
if their income is below the income of others because they may experience emotions 
such as envy. 
However, the emotional aspects referred to in these models have not been 
tested empirically. There is very little research in economics that actually investigates 
which emotions are at stake in the situation of interest, and what precisely their 
impact is. If existing models would accurately predict observed behavior this would 
not be that important. Unfortunately, we have not yet reached this blissful state, as 
will be evidenced also by the results presented in this paper. Therefore, we think that 
a much greater effort in investigating the economic significance of emotions, taking 
seriously the findings of psychology and neuroscience, is warranted. A model based 
on an incorrect view may lead to incorrect conclusions. For instance, if the driving 
force behind an individual’s decision to punish is anger but we incorrectly model it as 
envy, we will make wrong inferences regarding the action tendencies and other 
characteristics of the emotions at stake, and are consequently likely to make wrong 
predictions. In this case, for example, one might wrongly expect the individual to be 
in favor of some redistribution, instead of just opposing an intentional act (Lazarus, 
1991), and further neglect that people may feel more anger in public than in private 
(Jakobs et al., 1996). 
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Recently, a number of experimental studies have begun to explicitly 
investigate the links between emotions and negative reciprocity (e.g. Bosman and van 
Winden, 2002; Sanfey et al., 2003; Quervain et al., 2004; Bosman et al., 2005). They 
find substantial support for the economic significance of emotions, using various 
methods of measurement, and explain the responder’s decision to negatively 
reciprocate as a tradeoff between the emotional satisfaction of punishing an 
opportunistic act and the (more cognitive) reward of a monetary gain. 
The main purpose of this paper is to extend this kind of analysis to cases 
where there is more than one responder and where the responders either do or do not 
know each other. In order to do this in a tractable setting we use a three-person 
version of the power-to-take game (Bosman and van Winden, 2002). In this game, a 
proposer (or the take authority) can make a claim on the resources of one responder. 
Subsequently, the responder can destroy any part (including nothing and everything) 
of her own resources. In this paper, we alter the game so that the take authority can 
make a claim on the resources of two instead of one responder. Having multiple 
responders makes this game more realistic for social environments characterized by 
appropriation of which the power-to-take game captures important aspects, such as 
taxation, common agency or monopolistic selling (see Bosman and van Winden, 
2002). For illustration, one might think of a tax authority selecting an income tax rate, 
while tax payers can shirk the income tax base (at a cost to themselves). Furthermore, 
we investigate whether knowing each other as responders affects the emotional and 
behavioral response. 
The step from one to two responders is not at all trivial. On one hand, in the 
relationship between the proposer and a responder, two new factors are introduced 
that may affect the outcome of the game. First, if the benefit from punishing the 
proposer is independent of who does the punishing, an externality is introduced which 
opens up the opportunity to free ride with less punishment. Previous work on 
emotions does not tell us whether angry individuals will satisfy their desire to harm 
the take authority if some one else does the punishing. Furthermore, the possibility of 
taking money from two instead of one responder makes the situation between the 
proposer and each of the responders considerably more unequal. If this triggers a 
more intense emotional response then more destruction could result.  
On the other hand, the presence of a second responder introduces another set 
of considerations, namely, the relationship between the two responders. Responders 
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may care for their relative payoffs, and in addition, they may also care for how they 
will feel about each other’s behavioral response. In both cases, behavior may be 
affected by the belief of what the other responder is going to do. If a responder cares 
for relative payoffs,1 then her belief regarding the destruction decision of the other 
responder will determine whether her destruction increases or decreases the expected 
payoff difference between the two of them. This could lead to either more or less 
destruction. Alternatively, if a responder is concerned with how her action will be 
viewed by the other responder, then how much the other responder will destroy 
becomes, also from this perspective, a reference point for evaluating her decision. For 
example, if a responder destroys much less than the other, she might be seen as not 
standing up to unfair behavior, and conversely, if she destroys much more, she might 
be considered foolish for overreacting. A priori it is not clear what the behavioral 
consequences will be. 
Beliefs and emotional responses are likely to be affected by the kind of 
relationship that exists between the responders. For example, people put different 
weights on the opinions of others depending on the type and strength of the 
relationship between them. We care more for what our close friends think of us than 
what a complete stranger might think. Furthermore, it is to be expected that 
individuals also differ in the importance assigned to payoff differences depending on 
who the other person is. It would be natural to expect, for instance, that a responder 
would mind more if a friend gets a lower payoff than if a stranger does. Although 
there are a few experiments that study the effects of social distance by having subjects 
interact across different countries (e.g. Charness et al., 2003), there is practically no 
work on the effect of real social ties on the behavior of individuals in economic 
experiments.2 Hence, it is hard to predict the behavioral consequences of responders 
being friends instead of strangers. Since ties seem to play an important role in 
collective action (see Chong, 1991) and are potentially relevant in many economic 
situations (e.g. work environments), the issue whether and how they affect behavior is 
in fact of much wider interest. We have therefore decided to give it a prominent place 
in our experimental design. 
                                                 
1 As in the models of Levine (1998), Fehr and Schmidt (1999), Bolton and Ockenfels (2000), Charness 
and Rabin (2002), and Falk and Fischbacher (2005). 
2 An exception being Abbink et al. (2002). 
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The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we present the experimental 
design and link it to related studies. Section 3 describes the experimental procedures. 
Results are presented in Section 4. Section 5 discusses the main results in relation to 
the existing literature. Section 6 concludes. 
2. Design and Related Literature 
For our study we use a three-person version of the power-to-take game (Bosman and 
van Winden, 2002). In this one-shot game, one subject, who can be considered as the 
‘take authority’ (with endowment Etake), is matched with a pair of other subjects, the 
‘responders’ (each with an endowment Eiresp where i ∈ {1,2} indicates the responder). 
The game consists of two stages. In the first stage, the randomly chosen take authority 
decides on the ‘take rate’ ti ∈ [0,1], which is the part of responder i’s endowment after 
the second stage that will be transferred to the take authority. In the second stage, both 
responders decide simultaneously to destroy a part di ∈ [0,1] of their own endowment. 
For the take authority the payoff of the game equals her endowment plus the transfer 
from each of the responders, i.e. Etake + t1(1 – d1)E1resp + t2(1 – d2)E2resp, while 
responder i’s payoff equals the part of her endowment that she does not destroy minus 
the amount transferred to the take authority, i.e. (1 – ti)(1 – di)Eiresp. In order not to 
introduce too many behavioral issues at a time, in our experiment take authorities can 
only select a uniform take rate (that is, t1 = t2 = t) and all the endowments are equal 
(E1resp = E2resp = Etake).3
To study the impact of responders knowing each other, the experiment 
consists of two treatments, one where responders are anonymous to each other 
(‘strangers’ treatment), and one where responders know each other (‘friends’ 
treatment).  By comparing the results from the strangers treatment with earlier 
experiments involving only one responder, we can observe whether the presence of 
another responder appears to make a difference. By comparing the results from the 
strangers and friends treatments we can establish whether the existence of a tie 
between the responders makes a (further) difference. Furthermore, by using self-
reports as research method for measuring emotions (Clore and Robinson, 2002) we 
                                                 
3 The power-to-take game differs in three ways from the well-known ultimatum game. First, in the 
power-to-take game each participant has an endowment. Second, in this game only the endowment of 
the responder(s) is at stake. And third, the responders can destroy any amount of their endowment. 
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can determine which emotions are important in these settings and analyze their 
explanatory value for observed behavior. 
The simplicity of our design facilitates the study of the influence of emotions 
on behavior. First, each responder makes only one decision. This is useful since 
emotions can impact various decisions and it might be hard to disentangle which 
emotion influenced which decision. Second, responders cannot influence each other’s 
monetary payoffs. Therefore, we are able to observe how a responder feels about the 
decision of the other responder without interference of any effect the other responder 
might have had on the first responder’s income.  
Our work is related, on the one hand, to studies exploring the economic 
significance of emotions and, on the other hand, to studies investigating how the 
presence of others affects decision-making. Although still small in number, there are 
some studies explicitly dealing with emotions to explain responder behavior in the 
kind of game investigated in this paper. However, they are all restricted to the one-
proposer-one-responder case. A relatively early paper exploring this issue is Pillutla 
and Murnighan (1996). Responders in an ultimatum game experiment were asked, 
after each of a series of offers they had to accept or reject, to answer the open-ended 
question “How do you feel?” All offers were predetermined and afterwards a lottery 
selected one to determine actual payoffs. Answers to the feeling question were rated 
for expressions of the emotion of anger, and the rejection of offers was found to be 
related to this measure of anger. Their analysis also suggests that emotional reactions 
provide the critical link that determines when fairness perceptions tend to affect 
behavior. Bosman and van Winden (2002) introduced the power-to-take game with 
the specific purpose of explicitly investigating the importance of emotions for 
negative reciprocity in a situation of appropriation. In several experiments they had 
responders self-report on their feelings, but now concerning a whole list of different 
emotions (positive as well as negative) and with 7-point scales for them to indicate the 
felt intensity of the respective emotion (see also van Winden, 2001; Bosman et al., 
2005). In addition, they asked for responders’ expectations (regarding the take rate). 
Their results show that the destruction of own resources by responders is related to the 
intensity of experienced negative emotions (particularly, contempt, irritation, and 
anger), which in turn is positively related to the actual take rate and negatively to the 
expected take rate.  
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Recently, for both games evidence has been found of a biological substrate for 
the negative reciprocity exhibited by responders. Sanfey et al. (2003), using fMRI of 
ultimatum game players, find that ‘unfair’ offers elicited activity in brain areas related 
to both emotion and cognition, and significantly heightened activity in an area related 
to emotions in case of rejection.4 Regarding the power-to-take game, Ben-Shakhar et 
al. (2004), using skin conductance as physiological measure of emotional arousal as 
well as self-reports, find that both self-reported anger and physiological arousal are 
related to destruction, with frustrated expectations playing an important and consistent 
role. Moreover, the self-reported measures of emotions appeared to be correlated with 
the physiological measures, which is reassuring for the use of self-reports in the study 
of reciprocity. 
In this study we take the important next step in this line of research by 
studying what happens when a third person is introduced. In this respect, our work is 
related to papers on three-person ultimatum games. For instance, various authors have 
conducted experiments using ultimatum games that involve an inactive dummy player 
(Güth and van Damme, 1998; Kagel and Wolfe, 2001; Bereby-Meyer and Niederle, 
2005). They find that responders seem to concentrate on their own as well as the 
proposers’ payoffs and mostly ignore the welfare of the dummy players. Knez and 
Camerer (1995) use the strategy method to observe if a pair of responders playing 
with the same proposer condition their acceptance on the amount offered to the other 
responder. They find that about half of the responders will condition their response on 
the income the other responder would get. Riedl and Vyrastekova (2003) ran a three-
person ultimatum game experiment in which they varied the effect the rejection of 
one responder has on the payoffs of another responder. They find that responders are 
more likely to reject proposals if this does not negatively affect their standing with 
respect to the other responder. However, all these experiments were not designed for 
an analysis of emotions and their explanatory value. Hence, important variables from 
that perspective, such as expectations, were not measured. Our experimental design is 
a first shot at exploring head-on the affective side of reciprocity in case of multiple 
potential reciprocators. 
Psychological studies suggest that people may react quite differently 
emotionally to the same situation when others are present, and the more so if the other 
                                                 
4 In a similar study, Quervain et al. (2004) show that the effective punishment of norm violators 
produces activity in areas of the brain associated with the processing of rewards. 
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person is a friend rather than a stranger (see e.g. Jakobs et al., 1996; Jakobs et al., 
1999). We want to explore the economic relevance of this literature by investigating 
whether the presence of another responder in the power-to-take game and the nature 
of the relationship between the responders has an effect not only on their emotional 
responses but also on their behavior and, furthermore, whether the emotional response 
is linked to behavior. 
3. Experimental Procedures 
The computerized experiment was run in November 2003 and May 2005 in the 
CREED laboratory of the University of Amsterdam. In total 189 subjects, almost all 
undergraduate students from the University of Amsterdam, participated in the 
experiment. About 42% of the subjects were students of economics. The other 58% 
were students from various fields such as biology, political science, law, and 
psychology. About 46% of the subjects were female. Subjects received a show-up fee 
of 5 euros, independent of their earnings in the experiment, and 10 euros as 
endowment. On average, subjects were paid out 13.52 euros. The whole experiment 
took about one hour. 
The experiment consisted of two treatments: a ‘strangers’ treatment, where the 
two responders in the game did not know each other, and a ‘friends’ treatment, where 
the responders knew each other. Subjects were allowed to sign up only if they did so 
as a pair, that is, they had to provide the name of someone they knew and with whom 
they would take part in the experiment. If a subject signed up with someone else but 
nevertheless showed up alone to the experiment, he or she was not allowed to 
participate. In this way we hoped to recruit subjects with social ties. This approach, 
which is similar to the one used by Abbink et al. (2002), gives the opportunity to 
employ individuals with stronger bonds than one can establish in the laboratory. In an 
attempt to measure the strength of each pair’s social tie, we asked each individual to 
describe the type of relationship they had with their partner and how frequently they 
saw each other.  
After arrival in the lab’s reception room, each pair of subjects drew a card to 
be randomly assigned to two seats in the laboratory. Once everyone was seated the 
instructions for the (one-shot) power-to-take game were read, followed by a few 
exercises to check the subjects’ understanding of the procedures (a translation of the 
instructions is provided in Appendix A). After these exercises the subjects were 
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informed, by opening an envelope on their desk, which role (that of ‘take authority’ or 
‘responder’) they had been assigned in the game. The game was framed as neutral as 
possible, avoiding any suggestive terms (like ‘take authority’). Subsequently, the 
subjects were randomly assigned into groups of three. In the strangers treatment, 
subjects that came together to the experiment were assigned to different groups. 
Hence, complete anonymity was ensured since none of the members of the group 
knew who the other group members were. In the friends treatment, each group 
included a take authority and a pair of responders who signed up together for the 
experiment. Consequently, in this treatment anonymity was ensured between take 
authorities and responders but not between the responders themselves. In other words, 
take authorities knew that the responders in their group were people that came 
together to the experiment, but they did not know which responders they were. 
Similarly, responders knew that the other responder in their group was the individual 
with whom they came to the experiment whereas they did not know the identity of the 
take authority. The group assignment was clearly explained in the instructions. 
Subjects then played the three-person power-to-take game via the computer.5 
During the game, subjects were asked to fill out a few forms indicating not only their 
decisions but also how they felt, which take rate they expected, and which take rate 
they considered to be fair. Since in this paper we will concentrate on the responders’ 
behavior, Figure 1 shows the precise order in which the responders’ decisions, 
emotions and expectations were measured. Note that we asked subjects to report what 
they expected others to do before they observed their actual behavior. As in Bosman 
and van Winden (2002) subjects’ emotions towards other players were measured 
through self-reports after the subject observed what the others did. We asked for the 
fair take rate, at the end, in the debriefing questionnaire. 
Responder i
Expected  
take rate te
Fairness 
perceptions tf
Expected 
destruction rate dje
Observes t Observes djEmotions after
observing t
Emotions after
observing dj
Decision:
destruction
rate di
 
FIGURE 1 – SEQUENCE OF EVENTS FOR RESPONDERS 
                                                 
5 The experiment was programmed and conducted with the software z-Tree (Fischbacher, 1999). 
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Expectations were measured by asking subjects to indicate the most likely value for t 
or dj.6 In addition to the point estimate, we asked subjects to indicate on a 7-point 
scale how confident they were of their expectation. Emotions were measured by 
providing subjects with a list of fourteen emotion names and asking them to report on 
a 7-point scale with what intensity they experienced each emotion. The scale ranged 
from “no intensity at all” (1) to “very intensely” (7). The list included the following 
emotions: admiration, anger, contempt, disappointment, envy, gratitude, guilt, 
irritation, joy, pride, regret, sadness, shame, and surprise. A variety of emotions were 
included to avoid pushing subjects in a particular direction. 
4. Results 
In this section we present and analyze the decisions that were taken and the emotions 
that subjects experienced. Furthermore, we investigate whether the reported emotions 
help explain the behavior of the responders in both treatments. A summary of the 
individual data is provided in Appendix B. 
4.1. Observed behavior 
On average, the take rate was 58.6% in the strangers treatment and 62.3% in the 
friends treatment. Interestingly, these take rates are very similar to the 60.0% mean 
take rate reported in the comparable one-responder power-to-take game (Bosman et 
al., 2005). The similarity between the take rates in both treatments leads to our first 
result. 
RESULT 1: Take rates do not differ between the friends treatment and 
strangers treatment. 
Support: Using Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney (WMW) and Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests, 
the hypothesis that the take rates are drawn from the same distribution cannot be 
rejected (p = 0.78 and p = 0.42).7  
 
Turning now to the responders, in both treatments, a considerable number of 
responders destroyed some or all of their endowment. In the strangers (friends) 
                                                 
6 We decided to measure expectations in this way since subjects might have difficulty in reporting a 
probability distribution of a continuous variable (over the interval [0,1]). 
7 Throughout the paper, unless it is otherwise noted, we always use a Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney test. 
Furthermore, all tests in the paper are two-sided. 
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treatment 21.4% (40.0%) of the responders destroyed a positive amount. On 
aggregate, responders in the strangers (friends) treatment destroyed 13.2% (29.4%) of 
their endowment. For both measures, these results are respectively below (strangers 
treatment) and above (friends treatment) the ones obtained for the one-responder 
game. In Bosman et al. (2005) 37.5% of the responders destroyed a positive amount, 
while on aggregate, 24.70% of the endowment was destroyed. The difference in 
destruction between strangers and friends is even starker if we concentrate on 
responders who faced high take rates, that is, take rates that are above the average 
take rate. This leads us to our second result. 
RESULT 2: Friends destroy more and more frequently than strangers. This 
difference is due to high destruction rates among friends when faced with high 
take rates. 
Support: Using WMW tests, one can reject the hypothesis that friends and strangers 
destroy equal quantities (p = 0.02) and equally often (p = 0.03). Among the 
responders who faced an above-average take rate, strangers destroyed on aggregate 
less than friends, namely 29.5% vs. 67.3% (p = 0.01). Moreover, only 30.0% of 
strangers destroyed some of their endowment whereas 78.6% of friends decided to do 
so (p = 0.01). There are no significant differences between friends and strangers for 
responders who faced a below average take rate (p > 0.85). This result is partly driven 
by the fact that friends are more likely to destroy all of their endowment than 
strangers: 24.3% of the friends destroyed everything while only 8.9% of the strangers 
did so (p = 0.03).8
 
These two results suggest that, whereas at high take rates friends are likely to destroy 
more and more frequently than strangers, the behavior of take authorities does not 
depend on whether they are facing a pair of friends or a pair of strangers. This can be 
further substantiated by looking at the earnings of the take authorities. In the strangers 
treatment, take authorities choosing a high take rate earned on average 2.25 euros 
                                                 
8 It would certainly be of interest to know if the strength of the social tie between responders has an 
effect on destruction. Unfortunately, we have very little variation in the two variables used to measure 
the strength of social ties, and hence, we cannot make a meaningful analysis. Roughly 60% of all pairs 
reported their type of relationship as a “friendship” while the other 40% was evenly distributed among 
four categories. Similarly, 60% of all pairs reported their frequency of contact as “very frequent” while 
the other 40% was evenly distributed among three categories. 
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more than take authorities who chose a low take rate. They also faced more risk, 
however, in the sense of a higher variance in earnings. In contrast, in the friends 
treatment, take authorities who chose a high take rate earned on average 4.04 euros 
less than those choosing a low take rate, even though they too faced a larger variation 
in earnings. Hence, while in the strangers treatment it might make sense to choose a 
high take rate and risk some variation in income, in the friends case this is clearly an 
inferior choice. Nevertheless, it turns out that the proportion of take authorities 
choosing a high take rate is roughly the same in both treatments. 
4.2. Determinants of behavior 
To investigate what is motivating a responder to destroy, we estimated a multivariate 
tobit model for the probability of destruction, using as explanatory variables: 
demographic data (gender and area of study), the take rate, the expected take rate, the 
perceived fair take rate, and treatment dummies. In addition, we checked for 
interaction between the explanatory variables and used any significant interaction 
term(see Table C1 in Appendix C). The following result is obtained.  
RESULT 3: Destruction is positively related to the take rate and to the 
difference between the actual and the expected take rate. 
Support: Judged by the signs of the (weakly) significant coefficients (p < 0.10), it 
appears that responders who are likely to destroy some or all of their endowment are 
responders who: faced high take rates and/or experienced large positive differences 
between the take rate and their expected take rate. Furthermore, friends have a bigger 
coefficient than strangers for the influence of the take rate on the amount of 
destruction (Wald test, p = 0.05). This mirrors our previous result where we found 
that friends destroy more frequently than strangers when faced with high take rates. 
Contrary to what one would expect given the emphasis on fairness in the literature, 
but in line with the findings of Pillutla and Murnighan (1996), it is less clear whether 
the variable measuring the difference between the actual take rate and the fair take 
rate is a significant determinant of destruction. Finally, the regression also suggests 
that women may destroy less than men do. 
4.3. Experienced Emotions 
The intensity scores of emotions reveal that subjects experienced a variety of 
emotions. Concentrating on how emotions influenced the destruction decision gives 
us a clear result.  
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RESULT 4: Destruction is positively (negatively) related to the intensity of 
experienced negative (positive) emotions. 
Support: We estimated a tobit model for each emotion separately, with destruction as 
the dependent variable and censored at d = 0 and d = 100. The resulting coefficients 
and their level of significance are presented in Table 1. 
 
The table shows that, in both treatments, similar negative (as well as positive) 
emotions are related to destruction behavior. WMW tests give further support for this 
finding: responders who destroyed reported significantly higher intensities of anger, 
contempt, disappointment, and irritation, and significantly lower intensities of joy and 
gratitude (p < 0.07). Furthermore, for none of these emotions can we find a significant 
difference in the intensity scores between the two treatments (for both responders who 
destroyed and responders who did not, p > 0.21). 
TABLE 1 – TOBIT REGRESSIONS FOR EMOTIONS WITH DESTRUCTION AS THE DEPENDENT VARIABLE 
Strangers Friends Explanatory variable 
Coef.  Std. Err. Coef.  Std. Err. 
gratitude 
anger 
disappointment 
irritation 
joy 
contempt 
admiration 
sadness 
regret 
envy 
surprise 
shame  
pride 
guilt 
–44.888*
–33.073*
–32.495*
–29.179*
–44.862*
–30.091*
–35.294*
–14.682*
–50.786*
–23.359*
–13.721*
–38.207*
–10.829*
–10.412*
21.338 
16.724 
16.831 
15.298 
23.672 
15.990 
21.812 
18.829 
33.930 
16.224 
15.103 
47.329 
16.398 
33.129 
–87.711**
–54.561**
–56.900**
–55.219**
–68.441**
–55.870**
–95.017**
–49.216**
–11.786**
–15.280**
–23.085**
–18.045**
–25.921**
–22.905**
28.685 
17.787 
19.427 
16.181 
21.996 
16.425 
37.292 
25.170 
28.716 
16.318 
16.512 
29.285 
18.117 
36.298 
** Significant at the 5 percent level. * Significant at 10 percent level. 
 
Having found that destruction is related to experienced emotions, the question arises 
what explains the different emotional responses. To answer this question we estimated 
a multivariate ordered probit model, with the intensity of different positive and 
negative emotions as the dependent variable. For the analysis we concentrated on the 
emotions that turned out to be good predictors of destruction in both treatments (i.e. 
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anger, contempt, disappointment, gratitude, irritation, and joy). Again, we used as 
explanatory variables: demographic data (gender and area of study), take rate, 
expected take rate, perceived fair take rate, and treatment dummies. In addition, any 
significant interaction term was included. The following result is obtained. 
RESULT 5: The intensity of negative (positive) emotions is positively 
(negatively) related to the take rate and to the difference between actual and 
expected take rates. 
Support: In all the regressions for negative (positive) emotions the coefficient of the 
take rate has a positive (negative) sign. Furthermore, it is weakly significant in all 
cases (p < 0.10) except for disappointment. The same holds true for the coefficient of 
the difference between the take rate and the expected take rate (p < 0.05). For 
illustration, in Table C2 we present the results of one such regression. In this 
regression we used as dependent variable the average of the three anger-like 
emotions: anger, irritation, and contempt. The regression also points at a gender 
effect. It appears that female subjects are more likely to report lower intensities of 
negative emotions.9  
 
Summarizing, the same variables that are good predictors of destruction behavior (see 
Result 3) are also good predictors of the intensities of experienced emotions. In 
combination with the finding that emotions are good predictors of destruction, this 
suggests the following intuitive explanation for destruction: the higher the take rate 
and the larger the difference between the take rate and the expected take rate, the 
stronger the intensity of anger-like emotions experienced by a responder, which in 
turn makes it more likely that she will destroy in order to punish the take authority. 
These findings are consistent with, but strengthen and extend, those obtained for the 
one-responder power-to-take game. 
Further evidence that is easily explained with an emotion-driven account of 
destruction (but is hard to explain otherwise) is the time responders take to make their 
decision. In our experiment, responders that destroyed a positive amount not only 
reported higher intensities of negative emotions, they also took more time to make a 
decision (t test, p = 0.07). However, if we focus on responders who destroyed 
                                                 
9 In the regressions of individual emotions we find that women are more likely to report lower 
intensities of contempt and higher intensities of gratitude and joy. 
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everything, we find that, even though they reported the highest intensities of negative 
emotions, they did not take more time to decide than responders who did not destroy 
(t test, p = 0.43). In other words, the slowest responders turn out to be those who 
reported intermediate intensities of negative emotions and destroyed intermediate 
amounts. Standard economic theory gives us no reason to think why making the 
decision to destroy requires more time than making the decision not to destroy. 
However, research on emotions suggests the following. At low intensities of negative 
emotions a decision can take little time because there is no real conflict between the 
(cognitive) interest to earn as much money as possible and the (emotional) urge to 
punish the proposer. At higher intensities, this conflict does arise and hence one 
would expect subjects to take more time in order to sort it out. However, if the 
intensity of the negative emotions becomes very high it can push subjects over a 
threshold beyond which they are less prone to think and simply follow the emotion’s 
action tendency, which entails less time to reach a decision (Frijda, 1986; Frijda, 
1988; Goleman, 1995). 
Nevertheless, there is an important aspect of the data that is not explained by 
the emotional reaction of responders towards proposers. As was pointed out in Result 
2, at high take rates friends destroy more and more frequently than strangers. 
However, we do not find that at high take rates the emotional reaction of responders 
differs between treatments. This means that friends and strangers are equally angry 
and unhappy at high take rates (p > 0.33). A more detailed look at the data reveals that 
the disparity between destruction and anger is caused by the fact that angry strangers 
appear to destroy less frequently and smaller amounts than angry friends.10 This can 
be seen in Figure 2. 
As can be seen in the figure, in both treatments the ratio of non-angry and 
angry responders is roughly the same (2.11 to 1 for strangers and 2.04 to 1 for 
friends). Moreover, the frequency of destruction among non-angry responders is quite 
similar (15.8% for strangers vs. 21.3% for friends, p = 0.52). However, the frequency 
of destruction among angry responders is considerably different: whereas only 33.3% 
of the angry strangers destroyed something, 78.3% of angry friends decided to do so 
(p = 0.01). If we look at the amounts destroyed we also find a difference. On 
                                                 
10 We classified subjects as angry if they reported an intensity of 6 or more (on the 7-point scales) for 
any of the following emotions: anger, irritation or contempt. However, similar results are obtained with 
different definitions of being angry. 
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aggregate, angry strangers destroyed 30.0% of their endowment while angry friends 
destroyed 73.5% (p = 0.01). 
Strangers Treatment
Not angry:
68%
Angry:
32%
11%
57%
Did not destroy
Destroyed
11%
21%
Friends Treatment
Not angry:
67%
Angry:
33%
14%
53%
Did not destroy
Destroyed
26%
7%
 
FIGURE 2 – DESTRUCTION BY ANGRY AND NON-ANGRY RESPONDERS 
4.4. Coordination 
In order to explain this difference, we further analyze the behavior and emotional 
response of the responders. What we are interested in is to see whether pairs of friends 
behaved markedly different than pairs of strangers. The following results are 
obtained. 
RESULT 6: Friends are better at coordinating destruction than strangers. 
Support: In both treatments a comparable number of pairs of responders coordinate on 
similar destruction rates (i.e. within 10 percentage points of each other), specifically, 
60.7% of the pairs of strangers, and 62.9% of the pairs of friends. However, if we 
concentrate on pairs in which at least one of the two responders destroyed, we find a 
large difference between treatments. Among these pairs, in the strangers treatment 
only 8.3% coordinate on similar destruction rates whereas 42.8% do so in the friends 
treatment (p = 0.04). There is not a significant difference in the case of pairs where at 
least one responder did not destroy (p = 0.90). This result can also be observed if we 
look at the correlation between the destruction rates within pairs of responders. The 
correlation coefficient in the friends treatment is significantly higher than in the 
strangers treatment, 0.560 vs. –0.175 (z test, p = 0.01, this includes pairs of 
responders in which there was no destruction). 
 
A possible explanation for the better coordination of friends compared to strangers is 
that friends tend to be more alike (which could also explain why they are friends in 
the first place). However, sharing a similar preference for destruction cannot explain 
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why we observe such a big difference between the destruction rate in the friends 
treatment (where pairs of friends played in the same group) and the strangers 
treatment (where pairs of friends played in separate groups). A more plausible 
explanation for the better coordination of friends is that, first, they are better at 
predicting each other’s behavior and, second, that they have a preference for 
coordinating on the same action. 
Overall, half of the responders accurately predict the destruction rate of the 
other responder in their group. Specifically, 53.4% of the strangers and 54.3% of the 
friends correctly predict the destruction rate of the responder they were paired with 
(within 10 percentage points). Although we do not see that in general friends predict 
better than strangers, we do find that friends are better at predicting positive 
destruction. In total, 37.5% of the strangers and 50.0% of the friends thought the other 
responder would destroy a positive amount. Among these responders, in the strangers 
treatment, only 4.7% of them correctly predict the other’s destruction rate. Friends do 
much better with 34.3% of them making an accurate prediction (p = 0.01). There are 
no significant differences between treatments if we look at responders who thought 
the other would not destroy (p = 0.39). The better predicting ability of friends is also 
evident if we look at the correlation between the actual and the expected destruction 
rate. The correlation coefficient is significantly higher in the friends treatment (0.518 
vs. –0.036, z test, p = 0.01). 
Lastly, we also find evidence within the strangers treatment indicating that 
people are better at predicting the destruction rate of their friends. In this treatment 
subjects also came together as friends but they were assigned to different groups. 
Nevertheless, they were assigned to the same role.11 Hence, after informing 
responders of the take rate faced by their friend, we were able to ask them to predict 
their friend’s destruction rate. If we compare each responder’s ability to predict the 
behavior of their friend vs. the behavior of the responder they were paired with, we 
find that they do considerably better when predicting their friend’s destruction rate. 
Specifically, 53.6% of responders correctly predict the destruction rate of the other 
responder in their group, whereas 73.2% of them correctly predict the destruction rate 
of their friend. The better accuracy of responders when predicting the behavior of 
                                                 
11 Subjects did not learn that they were assigned to the same role until they reached the debriefing 
questionnaire. The experiment’s instructions simply gave no information concerning the role assigned 
to their friend. 
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friends is due to better predictions of positive destruction rates. Only 4.8% of 
responders correctly predict the positive destruction of the other responder in their 
group. In contrast, 30.8% of them accurately predict the positive destruction rate of 
their friend (p = 0.04).  
Even though friends predict destruction better than strangers, this should not 
lead to more coordination among friends unless responders within a group care about 
each other’s destruction rate. Looking at the emotional response between responders 
demonstrates that both friends and strangers care about what the other responder does. 
However, there is one important difference. Whereas strangers wish to avoid being 
the one who destroys more, friends wish to coordinate on the same destruction. This is 
leads to the following result. 
RESULT 7: The emotional response towards the other responder’s behavior 
facilitates the coordination of destruction among friends but not among 
strangers. 
Support: To back up this result we compare differences in emotional intensity scores 
across two sets of responders.12 The first set consists of responders who destroyed 
more than the responder they were paired with. For convenience, we will call them 
the ‘punishers’. The second set consists of responders who destroyed less than the 
other responder, which will be labeled the ‘acquitters’, for short. In the strangers 
treatment, punishers reported higher intensities of disappointment, irritation, and 
sadness than acquitters (p < 0.07). Given this negative emotional response, it stands to 
reason that, ceteris paribus, strangers would prefer to be among the acquitters rather 
than the punishers. In contrast, in the friends treatment, punishers reported similar 
emotional intensities as acquitters for all emotions (p > 0.29). Hence, given the 
choice, friends unlike strangers might be indifferent between being in the punisher or 
acquitter position. Further support is obtained if we compare acquitters with paired 
responders who destroyed the same amount: the ‘coordinators’. Compared to 
coordinators, acquitters in the friends treatment reported, on one hand, more anger, 
irritation, and disappointment, and on the other hand, less joy and gratitude (p < 0.08). 
Therefore, given the choice, friends would presumably prefer to be coordinators 
                                                 
12 Since we are interested in explaining the difference between friends and strangers, we concentrate on 
the emotions that, in this analysis, exhibited significantly different patterns across treatments, namely: 
admiration, anger, disappointment, gratitude, irritation, joy, and sadness. 
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rather than acquitters. In contrast, in the strangers treatment, acquitters reported 
similar emotional intensities as coordinators for all these emotions (p > 0.10). Thus, 
from this point of view, strangers would be indifferent between being a coordinator 
and being an acquitter. 
 
Summarizing, in view of the just discussed differences in emotional responses 
between responders, if subjects anticipate their emotional response then destroying 
seems to be more risky for strangers than for friends since it might leave them in the 
‘punisher’ position inducing additional negative emotions. The very negative 
emotional reaction experienced by strangers in the punisher position is also evident 
across treatments. Strangers feel more anger, irritation, and disappointment than 
friends when they destroy more than the other responder (p < 0.04). This may explain 
why, even when very angry, strangers often decide not to destroy. Friends, on the 
other hand, seem to have a strong preference for coordination. This is evident from 
their emotional response. Friends who coordinate experienced more admiration, 
gratitude, and joy than strangers who coordinate (p < 0.01). Consequently, angry 
friends may be much more inclined to destroy, especially if they believe that the other 
responder will also destroy. Moreover, the fact that they also predict each other’s 
behavior better further facilitates them to obtain the positive emotional boost of 
coordination.  
However, we should also discuss a potentially alternative explanation of 
destruction behavior. Since in our experiment friends had the possibility of interacting 
after the experiment, side payments were possible. So, one could perhaps argue or 
conjecture that the stronger coordination among friends who destroy is due to these 
side payments and not because of any differences in emotional responses. We have 
not succeeded ourselves in finding a convincing explanation, side-stepping emotions, 
in which side payments may lead to more coordination among responders. 
Nonetheless, in order to test if side payments played a role, we asked subjects in the 
debriefing questionnaire, first, if they intended to share their earnings after the 
experiment, and, second, if the possibility of sharing earnings after the experiment 
affected their decision. If side payments would indeed boost coordination one would 
expect more coordination among responders who answered positively to one or both 
of the abovementioned questions. However, we find no significant difference in 
coordination between those who answered positively or negatively to any of these two 
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questions. This is also true if we look only at angry responders, that is, the responders 
who acted noticeably different across the two treatments (p > 0.35). Hence, we 
tentatively conclude that although side payments were possible they played no 
significant role in the game. 
4.5. Expected take rates and fairness perceptions 
Expectations about the take rate turned out to have an important influence on the 
intensity of emotions and destruction behavior. This is further illustrated by Figure 3. 
Responders are divided into two groups: ‘optimists’, that is, people who expected a 
lower take rate than the one they faced (observations above the diagonal), and 
‘pessimists’, who expected a higher take rate than the one they faced (observations 
below the diagonal). It is easy to see from the figure that destruction, and especially 
high destruction (at least 50%), is carried out almost exclusively by ‘optimists’.13 A 
plausible explanation is that, first, subjects form an expectation of what the average 
take authority will do and, then, judge the degree of (un)kindness of the take authority 
by the deviation from this reference point. Negative deviations are judged as unkind 
and are punished by destruction. 
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FIGURE 3 – SCATTER PLOT OF ACTUAL AND EXPECTED TAKE RATES 
Instead of having as reference point the expectation of what the take authority will do, 
a responder may (also) be affected by what she thinks the take authority should do, 
that is, the reference point could be the take rate that she considers fair. However, as 
                                                 
13 Of the responders who destroyed (at least 50%) 65.0% (82.8%) are optimists. 
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noted in the discussion of Result 3, the responder’s fair take rate is not as clearly 
related to destruction as the expected take rate is. For example, once we control for 
the effect of the take rate by looking only at take rates in the third quartile, we find 
that, although responders who experienced an above average difference between the 
take rate and the fair take rate destroyed more frequently than the rest, this difference 
is not statistically significant (p = 0.38). In contrast, if we do the same test for the 
difference between the take rate and the expected take rate, we find a higher 
frequency of destruction among responders who experienced an above average 
difference (p = 0.08). 
It appears that deviations from the expected take rate are more important than 
deviations from the fair take rate. This is the case even though it is argued that equity 
considerations are especially important in highly asymmetric situations with complete 
information (Smith, 1976; Fehr et al., 1993). This is not to say that fairness 
perceptions do not play a role in the responders’ decision-making. It may be that 
fairness plays a more indirect role than usually envisaged. Suggestive in this respect is 
the following analysis. Focusing on the difference between the expected take rate and 
the fair take rate shows that in only 5.6% of the cases this difference was negative. In 
other words, the overwhelming majority of responders expected a higher take rate 
than the one they considered fair (reflected by the average fair take rate being lower 
than the average expected take rate). An almost identical pattern is seen if we look at 
the relationship between the take rate chosen by proposers and the take rate proposers 
considered fair (only 4.8% of proposers chose a take rate that was lower than their fair 
take rate). Indeed, a glance at the scatter plot of the fair and chosen take rates or the 
fair and expected take rates suggests that individuals seem to use their fair take rate as 
a lower bound for their choice or expectation (see Figure 4). 
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FIGURE 4 – SCATTER PLOTS OF FAIR AND ACTUAL OR EXPECTED TAKE RATES 
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To conclude, it seems that proposers are using the take rate they consider to be fair as 
a reference point for the determination of the optimal take rate. Similarly, responders 
may use their fair take rate as a reference point to form an expectation of what the real 
take rate will be. Once this expectation has been formed, it is a deviation from the 
expected take rate that triggers the high intensities of anger that motivate responders 
to destroy. 
5. Discussion 
In this section we further discuss our results and relate them to recent modeling 
attempts to account for reciprocity in decision-making. First, we emphasize the fact 
that negative reciprocity seems to be particularly motivated by anger. Second, we 
draw attention to three important aspects of our results that are either missing or 
unsatisfactorily modeled in the existing approaches. Namely, the role of expectations, 
the importance of reference points, and the effects of social ties.  
5.1. Anger induced punishment 
Although it might seem intuitively obvious, it is not until recently that economists 
have started to realize that punishment of opportunistic behavior may be motivated by 
anger. Knowing this is important because a model based on incorrect motivations may 
lead to incorrect predictions. For instance, if the driving force behind an individual’s 
decision to punish is anger but we incorrectly model it as envy (as suggested in 
Kirchsteiger, 1994 and Fehr and Schmidt, 2000), we will make wrong inferences 
regarding the action tendencies and other characteristics of the emotions at stake, and 
are consequently likely to make wrong predictions. In this case, one might ignore that 
anger, as opposed to envy, is elicited by acts perceived as intentional (Haidt, 2003) 
and hence overlook the important role that intentions have on punishment behavior 
(Falk et al., 2000; Charness and Levine, 2003). Furthermore, one could neglect that 
anger’s action tendency is to attack as opposed to the reduction of disparities 
(Lazarus, 1991), and hence, expect individuals that were treated unfairly to be in favor 
of compensation (e.g. from a third party) as opposed to harming the unfair person.  
Recent research has demonstrated that individuals who are treated unfairly 
derive satisfaction from successfully punishing the offending party (Quervain et al., 
2004). This raises the important question whether one could interpret punishment as 
simply another good that can be consumed to increase one’s utility. If so, this would 
allow us to apply standard theoretical economic analysis to an otherwise puzzling 
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phenomenon (Anderson and Putterman, 2004; Carpenter, 2004; and for a critical view 
see van Winden, 2001). In this respect, it is important to point out that, even if anger 
was triggered by unfair behavior (e.g. deviations from equality or a maximin norm), 
the goal of angry individuals is to harm the other party, and not, through punishment, 
to correct unfair material outcomes.14 This explains why we see individuals 
punishing, even when it is impossible to reduce income inequalities. For example, in 
the power-to-take game used in this paper, destruction leads to lower income 
inequality only when the take rate is above 50.0%. However, we still see 13.2% of 
subjects destroying a positive amount at take rates that are equal to or below 50.0%. 
Another less studied aspect of punishment that can be accounted for with an anger-
motivated explanation is that in some cases, subjects punish more than the amount 
that is needed to equalize earnings. For instance, Hopfensitz and Reuben (2005) study 
a game in which some subjects have precisely this opportunity. They find that 31.3% 
of the subjects punished to the point were the offending subject had lower earnings 
than the punisher did. Similar results can be seen in public goods games with 
punishment such as in Fehr and Gächter (2002). In this sense, outcome based models 
of social preferences such as Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Bolton and Ockenfels 
(2000) miss an important characteristic of punishment behavior. 
There are various known characteristics of anger that have not been 
theoretically modeled (e.g. people tend to feel more anger in public than in private, 
Jakobs et al., 1999). However, here we would like to concentrate on one important 
component of anger that is not yet modeled satisfactorily, namely, the fact that anger 
is affected by the expectations of what happened in the past.  
5.2. Expectations about what happened 
Current models that attempt to capture fairness motivations ignore the role of 
unfulfilled expectations on negative reciprocity. Roughly speaking, models that 
incorporate fairness notions fit within two approaches, an outcome-based approach 
and an intention-based approach. In the former, fairness is related to differences in 
monetary outcomes (e.g. Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000). In 
the intention-based approach, individuals are considered unfair, or more precisely 
                                                 
14 In this respect, as is argued by Carpenter and Matthews (2005), there is an important difference 
between anger-induced punishment by the affected individual and indignation-induced punishment by 
an unaffected third party.  
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unkind, depending on how their choices affect the final outcome of a game, and the 
desirability of this outcome compared to other feasible ones.15 Though both 
approaches have proven to be quite successful in explaining a range of different 
experimental results, they fail to explain the effect of the expected take rate on the 
responders’ decision to destroy. 
Our experimental results indicate that a responder’s expected take rate is an 
important explanatory variable of whether she destroys or not. From a psychological 
point of view one can expect that someone would feel higher intensities of anger in 
the case of high expectations that were proved wrong as opposed to the case of low 
expectations that were confirmed (Ortony et al., 1988). Nonetheless, this simple and 
intuitive reaction is not modeled in either the outcome-based or the intention-based 
approach. 
In the outcome-based approach expectations are not modeled at all. That is to 
say, in these models, once responders observe the real take rate, the take rate they 
expected is no longer relevant. Hence, in these models responders who destroy differ 
from responders who do not destroy only in how much they care about payoff 
differences. In other words, their preferences differ. Since we generally think of these 
preferences as fixed (at least in the short-run), we might tend to think that we are 
observing stable types of individuals (such as selfish or fair-minded) that will behave 
as such across games and time. Furthermore, individual behavior would be less 
susceptible to manipulation through framing or by observing others. If on the other 
hand, expectations explain a large part of the heterogeneity we observe in 
experiments, then we should be much more careful in predicting how subjects will 
behave across games and time.16 It would also imply that framing or information that 
affects expectations can have a big impact on the behavior of individuals. 
Furthermore, since expectations, unlike preferences, may change substantially in the 
                                                 
15 Papers in this approach include Rabin (1993), Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004), and Falk and 
Fischbacher (2005) who combine both the outcome-based and the intention-based approaches. 
16 We do not dismiss the possibility of consistent differences between people based on how strongly 
they feel about fairness norms. However, our results suggest that they can explain only part of 
responders’ behavior. 
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short-run, behavior might adjust faster than a model based solely on preferences 
would predict.17
In the intention-based approach, which uses psychological game theory 
(Geanakoplos et al., 1989), expectations play an important role, but not in the way we 
have discussed here. As in the outcome-based approach, in these models once a 
responder observes the take rate, her expected take rate has no longer an effect on her 
decision. The only expectation that has an effect is the responder’s expectation of 
what the take authority expects the destruction rate to be (which determines the 
kindness of the take authority’s choice). Furthermore, in these models attention is 
focused on equilibria when individuals correctly anticipate the actions of others. 
However, this raises the question, to what extent these models capture experienced 
emotions (see Elster, 1998).  
Some of our results are in line with the theoretical predictions of the models of 
Rabin (1993) and Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2004). For instance, we find that 
even when expectations are fulfilled, people that faced above average take rates (more 
unkindness) experienced higher intensities of disappointment and lower intensities of 
gratitude, joy and admiration.18 The reason is that the intensity of emotions does not 
only depend on the degree of unexpectedness of an event, but also on the extent to 
which the individual’s interests are affected (see e.g. Ortony et al., 1988), which 
relates to the take rate as such. More research is needed, though, to see whether this 
effect survives in the longer run. With experience, people not only learn to anticipate 
what others will do, they may also habituate to situations and may gradually become 
less emotional about anticipated adverse events. 
Although fulfilled expectations might be a plausible assumption for the long-
run, in many situations there is simply not enough time to learn what others will do. In 
these circumstances, understanding the emotional reactions to deviations from 
expected actions might prove very useful for predicting how individuals will behave. 
Furthermore, in cases in which the long-run outcome is heavily influenced by the 
initial situation, emotions experienced when expectations are still unfulfilled can have 
                                                 
17 For example, one would expect that if a responder consistently sees high take rates, she will 
eventually update her expectation upwards. In such a case, assuming that the observed relationship 
between expectations and emotions holds over time, one might observe less destruction.  
18 WMW tests (p < 0.07), where “fulfilled expectations” means that the expected take rate equaled the 
actual take rate (within a range of plus or minus 5 percentage points). 
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a crucial effect on long-run behavior. Moreover, emotions may have an additional and 
lasting effect since they can also affect the way individuals learn from experiences 
(Bower, 1992) and therefore affect the path through which the long-run outcome is 
obtained. 
5.3. Reference points 
Another neglected aspect in the modeling of fairness is the income that is taken as a 
reference point. If we compare the results of our experiment with the results of 
experiments that use the related ultimatum game, it is easy to see that any theory that 
wishes to explain both sets of results will have to take into account the possibility of 
changing reference points. As reported in Camerer (2003), in ultimatum games the 
proposers’ share of the mean offer is usually between 60% and 70% and the share of 
the median offer is usually between 50% and 60%. Furthermore, there is barely any 
destruction (rejection) if the proposer offers to keep less than 60%, while on aggregate 
about 50% of the income is destroyed if the proposer offers to keep more than 80%. 
In our power-to-take game, the mean take rate is 60.7% and the median take rate is 
50%. Moreover, only 4.1% of the responders’ income is destroyed at take rates below 
60%, while responders destroyed 63.2% of their income at take rates above 80%.19  
However, this similarity in results is misleading since in the power-to-take game only 
the responder’s income is at stake. Hence, if one compares the shares of the total 
income that the proposer walks away with, it is much higher in the power-to-take 
game than in the ultimatum game. 
These results seem incompatible with all the theories using an outcome-based 
approach.20 These theories assume that people dislike unequal distributions of 
income. In the ultimatum game, the more a proposer cares about income differences 
the more likely it is that she will make a generous offer to the responder. Hence, if we 
increase the endowment of the proposer relative to the endowment of the responder 
(as we do in the power-to-take game) one should observe on average lower take rates. 
Since in ultimatum games about half of the subjects offer a fifty-fifty split, the 
                                                 
19 The results of the one-responder power-to-take game investigated by Bosman et al. (2005) show a 
mean (median) take rate of 59.9% (60%), while 7.5% (58.3%) of the responders’ income is destroyed 
at take rates below 60% (above 80%). 
20 This is also true for Falk and Fischbacher (2005) who combine both kinds of approaches. 
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percentage of ‘fair minded’ subjects is usually thought to be around that number.21 
For this reason, it is striking that in our experiment, even though proposers could offer 
a fifty-fifty split by choosing a take rate of 0%, none actually choose to do so.22 This 
large difference between the two games is hard to explain by any theory assuming that 
subjects are focusing on the experiment’s total income distribution. As suggested by 
Bolton and Ockenfels (2005), in these and similar cases, distribution-based fairness 
models work rather well if one simply adjusts them to take into account only the 
‘relevant’ income distribution. However, if we are to correctly predict behavior across 
a wide range of situations, we must incorporate into these theories an explicit way in 
which individuals adjust their reference incomes (Ariely et al., 2003). 
In this respect, the intention-based fairness models perform better than the 
outcome-based models. In these models, individuals use a fairness benchmark that 
depends solely on feasible outcomes. More specifically, it depends on how the take 
rate affects the responder’s payoff in comparison to the highest and lowest payoff the 
responder could get. Since the responder’s possible payoffs are not affected by any 
additional income the proposer might have, these models do not predict that proposers 
will choose lower take rates in the power-to-take game. 
5.4. Social Ties 
As shown in the previous section, social ties can have a considerable impact on 
behavior. Not only did friends react differently to higher take rates, their emotional 
reaction towards one another was also very different. However, none of the models 
discussed so far incorporate an effect of social ties. Doing so is important since not all 
meaningful economic interaction occurs between strangers. In cases such as 
interaction at the work floor, informal credit institutions, scientific research, and 
political participation, more interaction might actually occur between friends than 
between strangers. In fact, as argued by Rosenblat and Mobius (2004), technological 
advances that reduce communication costs, such as the internet, can make interaction 
among groups of friends even more important. 
In our experiment, angry friends managed to coordinate destruction much 
more frequently than angry strangers. If we consider the emotional reactions between 
                                                 
21 For example, Fehr and Schmidt (1999) estimate that about of 60% subjects would prefer an equal 
split over any other income distribution. 
22 In other power-to-take experiments the number of proposers choosing a take rate of 0% is smaller 
than 10% (Bosman and van Winden, 2002; Bosman et al., 2005). 
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responders, as discussed in Result 7, this is not surprising. Note that angry strangers 
who intend to destroy their income face a situation akin to a collective action 
problem. Our findings suggest that they would like to see the take authority punished 
but want to avoid being the player in the game that is left with the lowest payoff. We 
do not know the precise amount of satisfaction that subjects derive from each of the 
possible outcomes. Nevertheless, judging by the responders’ emotional reactions, it 
would not be farfetched to model the angry strangers’ situation as a prisoner’s 
dilemma or a stag hunt game. In either case, destruction is unlikely.23 In contrast, in 
the angry friends case, the observed desire of responders to coordinate on the same 
action combined with an impulse to destroy makes their situation noticeably different. 
Angry friends can be modeled as playing a coordination game in which destruction 
not only gives them the highest payoff but is also the risk-dominant choice, and 
hence, the most attractive option. 
We will discuss two natural ways of allowing for social ties in the two 
modeling approaches. The first way is to assume that friends are better than strangers 
at predicting what the other responder will do. The second way is to assume that 
friends, as opposed to strangers, care for each other’s utility. 
In the outcome-based approach, knowing what the others will do translates to 
friends knowing each other’s preferences. This might indeed lead to a situation in 
which strangers destroy less than friends. To see this, note that if the income 
difference between two responders is important, responders will wish to destroy 
similar amounts. In this case, uncertainty about the other’s preferences makes a 
responder’s destruction decision much more difficult. If, as suggested by Fehr and 
Schmidt (1999), individuals prefer advantageous inequality to disadvantageous 
inequality, then destroying less becomes more attractive since it gives a higher payoff 
if responders fail to coordinate. Hence, since strangers face more uncertainty about 
the other’s actions, on average, they will be likely to destroy less than friends. 
Nonetheless, this line of thought fails to describe one important aspect of the data, 
namely that the difference between friends and strangers occurs at high take rates. In 
the outcome-based approach, at high take rates the main concern of responders is to 
lower the income difference between themselves and the proposer. This is because, 
when facing a high take rate, unilateral destruction will only create small income 
                                                 
23 This is certainly true for the prisoners’ dilemma. In the stag hunt game, destroying is the risk-
dominated action and hence less likely, especially if subjects are risk adverse. 
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differences between the responders. Hence, under these conditions both friends and 
strangers would destroy very similar amounts. 
Assuming that friends care for each other’s utility might be a more promising 
way for the outcome-based approach to explain why friends destroy more than 
strangers when facing high take rates. If responders care for the utility of the other 
responder, then in addition to receiving disutility because the proposer has a higher 
income than they do, they will also receive disutility because the proposer has higher 
income than their friend does. This leads to a stronger desire to destroy, even at high 
take rates. In this respect, investigating the precise effect of an interdependent utility 
function might prove a fruitful line of research. 
In the intention-based approach, knowing better what the other responder will 
do does not affect behavior. The reason is that, in all the models within this approach, 
individuals care about each other’s income only if they can affect it through their 
actions. Since in this experiment responders could not affect each other’s income, 
these theories predict that knowing what the other responder will do has no effect on 
behavior. Therefore, as with the outcome-based approach, a more helpful way of 
incorporating social ties might be to assume that friends care for each other’s 
wellbeing. In the current models, an individual evaluates the kindness of others by 
looking at how their actions lead to a higher or lower payoff for the individual. The 
friends case could be modeled by allowing individuals to include into their evaluation 
the way others treat their friends. Unfortunately, due to the complexity of these 
models an interdependent utility function might produce a model that is very difficult 
to analyze. 
6. Conclusion 
An important goal of this paper was to extend the explicit study of emotions in 
economic decision-making to cases with more than two players. In addition, we 
looked at how social ties can affect emotional reactions and behavior. For this purpose 
we used a three-person power-to-take game. The experimental data demonstrate that 
high intensities of anger-like emotions and low intensities of joy-like emotions induce 
responders to destroy their income. We also find that friends and strangers as 
responders experience different emotional reactions towards one another, which leads 
to more destruction in the case of angry friends. 
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Our results indicate that the study of emotions helps explain observed 
behavior. Anger-like emotions appeared to be the main driving force behind the 
decision to destroy income. Furthermore, by observing the emotional reaction 
between subjects we could explain why friends are able to coordinate on destruction 
more frequently than strangers. Without investigating these emotional responses, the 
precise mechanism by which social ties affected the subjects’ choices would have 
remained unclear. 
In this paper we have also emphasized the role of expectations in determining 
the subjects’ emotional responses. One interesting issue for future research concerns 
the interaction between expectations and social norms. If social norms are based on 
the actual behavior of the majority of individuals in a society, then expectations may 
be largely fulfilled in many well established situations. However, when faced with 
new circumstances in which a social norm is not clearly defined, the initial 
expectations of individuals might have an important effect on the behavior that later 
becomes a norm. Hence, norms might be very susceptible to the initial conditions in 
which they are formed. 
In addition to expectations, we would like to emphasize the importance of 
studying social ties. Our experiment showed clear differences in emotional reactions 
depending on the presence of a social tie. In some situations this could lead to very 
different behavior that might be economically relevant. For example, the emotionally 
boost that friends receive from coordination might be one of the reasons people prefer 
to interact with friends rather than strangers. Results from the literature on social 
distance suggest that this type of preferences can lead to segregation, inefficient 
outcomes, and conflict between groups (Schelling, 1978; Borjas, 1995; Glaeser et al., 
1996; Akerlof, 1997). 
The behavioral differences induced by social ties could prove especially 
important if one is thinking on the effectiveness of various policies. It might be the 
case that a given policy would improve a situation only if individuals (do not) share 
social ties. Investigating the emotional responses may reveal the precise mechanism 
through which social ties affect people’s choices and could therefore help us predict 
the effects of different policies. To give an example, the emotional responses of 
friends indicate a strong desire to coordinate their actions. In this case, a coordination 
mechanism such as the possibility to make decisions sequentially (as in Potters et al., 
2005) might be more effective among friends than among strangers.  
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So far, the effects of social ties have received little attention in experimental 
investigations. To some extent, this neglect is due to the difficulty of creating strong 
social ties in controlled environments. The usual ingredients of complete anonymity, 
no face-to-face communication, and a short time period of interaction, produce an 
environment in which meaningful social bonding is difficult. Nevertheless, the design 
we have used suggests that it is possible to include social ties in experiments and to 
acquire insights into how to model them. 
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Appendix A – Instructions  
These are the instructions for the ‘friends’ treatment. The instructions for the 
‘strangers’ treatment were very similar, and are available upon request. 
Instructions (translation from Dutch) 
In order to sign up for this experiment, you had to sign up together with a second 
participant. For convenience, we will refer to this second participant as your partner. 
In the experiment each of you will be assigned to a 3-person group, that is, you plus 
two other participants. We will explain how groups are formed later on. 
Throughout the experiment, the type of decision you make will depend on 
your position in your group. Some of you will be positioned to move first, and some 
of you will be positioned to move second. Participants moving first will be referred to 
as As while participants moving second will be referred to as Bs. 
Before the experiment started each desk was assigned either an A or a B. 
Therefore, by randomly assigning the yellow cards (in the reception room), each 
participant was randomly assigned a position. Once you are informed which position 
has been assigned to you, the corresponding letter will appear on the top-right part of 
the screen. 
The 3-person group that you belong to depends on your position as well as on 
the position of others in the following way: 
• Your group (including yourself) consists of one A and two Bs. 
• If you are a B: 
o Then, the other B in your group is your partner (the person with whom 
you signed up). 
o The other participant will be a randomly chosen A. 
• If you are an A: 
o Then your partner (the person with whom you signed up) is also an A 
and thus he/she is not in your group. 
o The other two participants will be a randomly selected pair of Bs that 
signed up together for the experiment. 
Note: Each group, and thus also your group, was formed randomly in the sense that 
the A in the group does not know who the B’s are, and similarly the B’s do not know 
who the A is.  
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The experiment 
At the beginning of the experiment each participant – this includes all A participants 
and all B participants – will receive 10 euros as his/her initial endowment. The 
experiment consists of two phases. In phase one, only the A participant must make a 
decision. Similarly, in phase two, only the B participants must make a decision. 
Hence, every participant makes only one decision. In addition to the decision, during 
the experiment you will be asked to answer a few questions. 
Phase one: A chooses a percentage 
In this phase, A must choose a percentage and type it into the corresponding field on 
the screen. This percentage determines how much of the money of each B in the 
group after phase two, will be transferred to A. The percentage chosen by A must be 
an integer between 0 and 100 (inclusive). If you wish to make any calculations, you 
can use the calculator located on your desk. 
Once you are satisfied with your decision, you have to confirm it by clicking 
on the button “Ready”. Note that all decisions are final; once you have clicked on 
“Ready” there is no way of changing your choice. Once A has completed phase one, 
phase two begins. 
Phase two: each B chooses a percentage 
At the beginning of this phase, each B is informed of the percentage chosen by A. At 
this point, each B must also choose a percentage and type it into the corresponding 
field on the screen. This percentage determines how much of his/her initial 
endowment will B destroy. The percentage chosen by B must be an integer between 0 
and 100 (inclusive). Hence, the transfer from each participant B to participant A will 
be based on the endowment of B that is left. 
Once you are satisfied with your decision, you have to confirm it by clicking 
on the button “Ready”. Note that all decisions are final; once you have clicked on 
“Ready” there is no way of changing your choice. Once each person has made his/her 
decision, phase two ends. 
Payoffs 
After phase two, all participants will be informed of the amount of money they have 
earned during the experiment. You will also be informed of the amount of money 
earned by the other two participants in your group. 
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Example of how to calculate your payoffs 
We will now give an example for the purpose of illustration. Remember that all 
participants in your group have an initial endowment of 10 euros. Suppose that in 
phase one participant A decides that 30% of the endowment of each participant B will 
be transferred to him/her (participant A). In phase two, each B can destroy part or 
everything of his/her initial endowment. Suppose that both Bs decide to destroy 0% 
percent of their initial endowment. The transfer from each B to A is then equal to 3 
euros (30% of 10 euros). The earnings of each B are equal to 7 euros (namely, the 
initial endowment of 10 euros minus the transfer of 3 euros). The final endowment of 
A is equal to 16 euros (namely, the initial endowment of 10 euros plus twice a transfer 
of 3 euros). 
Now suppose that in this example, one of the B participants decides to destroy 
50% of his/her initial endowment. In this case, his/her transfer to A is only 1.5 euros 
(namely, 30% of the endowment that was not destroyed, i.e. is 30% of 5 euros). The 
earnings of A are equal to 14.5 euros (namely, the initial endowment of 10 euros plus 
3 euros transferred from the B who destroyed 0% plus 1.5 euros transferred from the 
B who destroyed 50%). The earnings of the B who destroyed 0% are again 7 euros, 
and, finally, the earnings of the B who destroyed 50% are 3.5 euros (namely, 50% of 
the initial endowment of 10 euros minus the transfer of 1.5 euros). 
In summary 
In the experiment you will be divided into groups of 3, each consisting of one A and 
two Bs (who signed up together for the experiment). The roles of A and B where 
randomly and anonymously assigned by drawing your table number. Each participant 
receives 10 euros as an initial endowment. Then there are two phases. In phase one, A 
decides on a percentage that indicates how much of the endowments of each B after 
phase two will be transferred to A. In phase two, each B decides what percentage of 
his/her initial endowment will be destroyed.  
If you have any questions now, please raise your hand. If you do not have any 
questions, please click on “Ready”. Note that once you click on “Ready” you will not 
be able to go back to the instructions. Next, we will ask you to answer a few questions 
in order to familiarize you with the calculation of your earnings. 
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Appendix B – Summary of individual data 
TABLE B1 – TAKE AND DESTRUCTION RATES BY GROUP AND TREATMENT 
 Friends Strangers 
Group # t d1 d2 t d1 d2
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
33 
34 
35 
29 
33 
35 
40 
40 
40 
40 
40 
42 
45 
46 
50 
50 
50 
50 
50 
55 
60 
60 
60 
60 
65 
65 
65 
70 
80 
80 
90 
90 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
0 
0 
20 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
5 
0 
0 
0 
0 
5 
100 
0 
0 
0 
20 
0 
25 
50 
100 
20 
100 
0 
90 
50 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
25 
0 
50 
0 
0 
0 
100 
0 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
100 
10 
39 
39 
50 
50 
50 
50 
50 
50 
50 
50 
50 
50 
50 
50 
50 
50 
50 
55 
70 
75 
80 
80 
80 
81 
82 
100 
100 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
10 
0 
10 
50 
0 
0 
100 
0 
0 
100 
90 
0 
0 
100 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
1 
70 
0 
10 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
0 
100 
0 
0 
100 
0 
0 
Where: t = take rate, di = destruction rate of responder i. 
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TABLE B2 – MEAN EMOTIONAL INTENSITY OF RESPONDERS REGARDING THE TAKE AUTHORITY 
 Friends Strangers 
Emotions of i di = 0 di > 0 di = 0 di > 0 
admiration 
anger 
contempt 
disappointment 
envy 
gratitude 
guilt 
irritation 
joy 
pride 
regret 
sadness 
shame 
surprise 
2.7 (1.9) 
2.3 (1.6) 
2.2 (1.7) 
2.7 (1.7) 
3.3 (1.7) 
3.5 (2.1) 
1.4 (0.9) 
2.9 (1.9) 
3.6 (2.0) 
2.3 (1.4) 
1.4 (1.0) 
1.6 (1.1) 
1.4 (0.9) 
4.0 (2.1) 
1.3 (0.7) 
4.1 (2.2) 
4.5 (2.2) 
4.3 (2.1) 
3.7 (2.3) 
1.5 (0.9) 
1.4 (0.8) 
5.2 (2.1) 
1.6 (1.3) 
2.8 (2.3) 
1.6 (1.2) 
2.2 (1.5) 
1.6 (1.3) 
4.5 (1.9) 
2.6 (1.8) 
2.8 (2.0) 
2.6 (2.1) 
3.0 (2.0) 
3.2 (1.9) 
3.1 (1.9) 
1.6 (1.0) 
3.4 (2.2) 
3.0 (1.8) 
2.8 (2.1) 
1.4 (0.9) 
2.1 (1.7) 
1.4 (0.8) 
3.7 (2.1) 
1.9 (1.3) 
4.0 (1.9) 
3.8 (2.2) 
4.3 (1.9) 
3.8 (2.3) 
1.9 (1.4) 
1.6 (0.9) 
4.6 (2.2) 
1.9 (1.2) 
2.7 (1.9) 
2.1 (1.2) 
2.4 (1.7) 
1.3 (0.6) 
4.1 (2.2) 
Numbers between brackets are standard deviations. 
 
TABLE B3 – MEAN EMOTIONAL INTENSITY OF RESPONDERS REGARDING THE OTHER RESPONDER 
 Friends Strangers 
Emotions of i di > dj di = dj di < dj di > dj di = dj di < dj
admiration 
anger 
contempt 
disappointment 
envy 
gratitude 
guilt 
irritation 
joy 
pride 
regret 
sadness 
shame 
surprise 
3.1 (2.2) 
2.3 (2.3) 
1.7 (1.3) 
2.6 (2.4) 
2.3 (2.1) 
2.7 (2.1) 
1.5 (1.1) 
2.5 (2.3) 
2.6 (2.0) 
3.1 (2.1) 
1.3 (0.7) 
1.9 (1.9) 
1.9 (1.8) 
4.7 (1.7) 
3.8 (1.9) 
1.1 (0.3) 
1.1 (0.3) 
1.1 (0.3) 
1.1 (0.3) 
3.2 (2.1) 
1.2 (0.8) 
1.1 (0.2) 
5.0 (1.3) 
4.8 (1.9) 
1.2 (0.7) 
1.1 (0.5) 
1.1 (0.3) 
2.1 (1.4) 
3.1 (2.2) 
1.6 (1.0) 
1.3 (0.7) 
1.6 (1.1) 
1.5 (1.1) 
2.0 (1.3) 
1.4 (0.9) 
1.6 (1.2) 
3.2 (2.1) 
2.5 (1.9) 
1.8 (1.5) 
1.3 (0.6) 
1.9 (1.6) 
4.1 (2.5) 
2.2 (1.5) 
3.3 (2.1) 
2.7 (2.1) 
4.1 (1.9) 
2.9 (1.7) 
1.6 (1.0) 
2.4 (1.6) 
4.3 (1.9) 
1.9 (1.5) 
2.2 (1.5) 
1.8 (1.2) 
2.1 (1.4) 
1.8 (1.1) 
4.8 (2.4) 
2.5 (1.6) 
1.8 (1.5) 
1.5 (1.1) 
1.9 (1.7) 
1.7 (1.3) 
1.8 (1.3) 
1.3 (0.9) 
2.0 (1.8) 
3.2 (2.0) 
3.6 (2.2) 
1.4 (0.9) 
1.7 (1.5) 
1.3 (0.9) 
2.0 (1.6) 
2.5 (1.9) 
2.2 (1.6) 
1.9 (1.0) 
2.2 (1.6) 
2.6 (1.9) 
1.8 (1.5) 
2.0 (1.5) 
2.8 (2.0) 
2.2 (1.7) 
2.0 (1.5) 
1.5 (1.0) 
1.3 (0.8) 
1.7 (1.2) 
3.7 (2.2) 
Numbers between brackets are standard deviations. 
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Appendix C – Regressions 
Tobit model with the destruction rate as the dependent variable (censured at d = 0 and 
d = 100).24
TABLE C1 – TOBIT MODEL ESTIMATING THE AMOUNT OF DESTRUCTION 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error p value 
Friends × Take Rate 
Strangers × Take Rate 
Take Rate – Expected Take Rate 
Take Rate – Fair Take Rate 
Economist 
Female 
Constant 
–––2.922 
–––2.076 
–––1.506 
–––1.046 
––15.905 
––47.494 
–208.562 
–1.129 
–1.073 
–0.612 
–0.637 
29.575 
29.431 
75.959 
0.011 
0.055 
0.015 
0.103 
0.592 
0.109 
0.007 
Number of obs.  =  126     LR χ2(6)  =  75.71 
Log likelihood  =  –150.429     Prob > χ2  =  0.000 
Dummy variables: Friends: 1 if friends treatment, 0 otherwise; Strangers: 1 if strangers treatment, 0 
otherwise; Economist: 1 if economics student, 0 otherwise; Female: 1 if female, 0 if male. 
 
Ordered probit model with the average of the three anger-like emotions (anger, 
irritation, and contempt) as the dependent variable. 
TABLE C2 – ORDERED PROBIT MODEL ESTIMATING THE INTENSITY OF ANGER-LIKE EMOTIONS 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error p value 
Take Rate 
Take Rate – Expected Take Rate 
Take Rate – Fair Take Rate 
Economist 
Female 
Friends 
–0.0146 
–0.0143 
–0.0002 
–0.2178 
–0.3185 
–0.0018 
0.0071 
0.0039 
0.0037 
0.2007 
0.1930 
0.1891 
0.039 
0.000 
0.957 
0.278 
0.099 
0.992 
Number of obs.  =  126     LR χ2(6)  =  47.49 
Log likelihood  =  –322.955     Prob > χ2  =  0.000 
Dummy variables as in Table C1. 
                                                 
24 Given the possibility errors are correlated among friends, we also ran the regression using robust 
standard errors and clustering within friend pairs. We get very similar results. The main difference is 
that the p value of the coefficient for ‘Take Rate – Fair Take Rate’ decreases to 0.045. Hence, although 
the fair take rate does reach a 5% level of significance, it still has a smaller effect than the expected 
take rate. 
 36
References 
Abbink, K., B. Irlenbusch, and E. Renner (2002). Group size and social ties in 
microfinance institutions. CeDEx Discussion Paper, University of 
Nottingham. 
Akerlof, G.A. (1997). Social distance and social decisions. Econometrica 65: 1005-
1027. 
Anderson, C.M. and L. Putterman (2004). Do non-strategic sanctions obey the law of 
demand? The demand for punishment in the voluntary contribution 
mechanism. Games and Economic Behavior, forthcoming. 
Ariely, D., G. Loewenstein, and D. Prelec (2003). Coherent arbitrariness: Stable 
demand curves without stable preferences. The Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 118: 73-106.  
Ben-Shakhar, G., G. Bornstein, A. Hopfensitz, and F. van Winden (2004). Reciprocity 
and emotions: Arousal, self-reports, and expectations. CREED Working paper. 
University of Amsterdam. 
Bereby-Meyer, Y. and M. Niederle (2005). Fairness in bargaining. Journal of 
Economic Behavior and Organization 56: 173-186. 
Bolton, G. and A. Ockenfels (2000). A theory of equity, reciprocity, and competition. 
American Economic Review 90: 166-193. 
Bolton, G. and A. Ockenfels (2005). A stress test of fairness measures in models of 
social utility. Economic Theory 25: 957-982. 
Borjas, G.J. (1995). Ethnicity, neighborhoods, and human capital externalities. 
American Economic Review 85: 365-389. 
Bosman, R., and F. van Winden (2002). Emotional hazard in a power-to-take game 
experiment. The Economic Journal 112: 147-169. 
Bosman, R., M. Sutter, and F. van Winden (2005). On the impact of real effort and 
emotions in power-to-take experiments. Journal of Economic Psychology 26: 
407-429. 
Bower, G. (1992). How might emotions affect learning? In Christianson, S.A. (Ed.) 
Handbook of emotion and memory: Research and theory. Hillsdale: Erlbaum. 
Camerer, C. (2003). Behavioral Game Theory. New Jersey: Princeton University 
Press. 
 37
Carpenter, J. P. (2004). The Demand for Punishment. Working paper. Middlebury 
College. 
Carpenter, J. P. and P. Matthews (2005). Norm Enforcement: Anger, Indignation or 
Reciprocity. Working paper. Middlebury College. 
Charness, G. and D. Levine (2003). The road to hell: An experimental study of 
intentions. Working paper 14-03. University of California, Santa Barbara. 
Charness, G. and M. Rabin (2002). Understanding social preferences with simple 
tests. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 117: 817-869. 
Charness, G., E. Haruvy, and D. Sonsino (2003). Social distance and reciprocity: The 
Internet vs. the laboratory. Working paper. University of California, Santa 
Barbara. 
Chong, D. (1991). Collective Action and the Civil Rights Movement. Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press. 
Clore, G.L. and M.D. Robinson (2002). Belief and feeling: Evidence for an 
accessibility model of emotional self-report. Psychological Bulletin 128: 934-
960. 
Dufwenberg, M. and U. Gneezy (2000). Measuring beliefs in an experimental lost 
wallet game. Games and Economic Behavior 30: 163-182. 
Dufwenberg, M. and G. Kirchsteiger (2004). A theory of sequential reciprocity. 
Games and Economic Behavior 47: 268-298. 
Elster, J. (1998). Emotions and economic theory. Journal of Economic Literature 36: 
47-74. 
Erard, B. and J.S. Feinstein (1994). Honesty and evasion in the tax compliance game. 
RAND Journal of Economics 25: 1-19. 
Falk, A. and U. Fischbacher (2005). A theory of reciprocity. Games and Economic 
Behavior forthcoming. 
Falk, A., E. Fehr, and U. Fischbacher (2000). Testing theories of fairness: Intentions 
matter. Working paper No. 63. University of Zürich. 
Fehr, E. and S. Gächter (2002). Altruistic punishment in humans. Nature 415: 137-
140. 
Fehr, E. and K. Schmidt (1999). A Theory of fairness, competition and cooperation. 
The Quarterly Journal of Economics 114: 817-868. 
Fehr, E. and K. Schmidt (2000). Theories of fairness and reciprocity: Evidence and 
economic applications. In Dewatripont, M., L. Hansen, and S.T. Turnovsky 
 38
(Eds.) Advances in Economics and Econometrics - 8th World Congress, 
Econometric Society Monographs. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Fehr, E., G. Kirchsteiger, and A. Riedl (1993). Does fairness prevent market clearing? 
An experimental investigation. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 108: 437-
459. 
Fischbacher U. (1999). Zurich toolbox for readymade economic experiments, 
experimenter's manual. Working Paper No. 21. Institute for Empirical 
Research in Economics, University of Zürich. 
Frank, R. H. (1987). If Homo Economicus could choose his own utility function, 
would he want one with a conscience. American Economic Review 77: 593-
604. 
Frijda, N.H. (1986). The emotions. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Frijda, N.H. (1988). The laws of emotion. American Psychologist 43: 349-358. 
Geanakoplos, J., D. Pearce, and E. Stacchetti (1989). Psychological games and 
sequential rationality. Games and Economic Behavior 1: 60-79. 
Glaeser, E.L. (2005). The political economy of hatred. The Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 120: 45-86. 
Glaeser, E.L., B. Sacerdote, and J.A. Scheinkman (1996). Crime and social 
interactions. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 111: 507-548. 
Goleman, D. (1995). Emotional intelligence: Why it can matter more than IQ. New 
York: Bantam Books. 
Güth W. and E. van Damme (1998). Information, strategic behavior and fairness in 
ultimatum bargaining: An experimental study. Journal of Mathematical 
Psychology 42: 227-247. 
Haidt, J. (2003). The moral emotions. In Davidson, R. J., K. R. Scherer, and H. H. 
Goldsmith (Eds.) Handbook of Affective Sciences. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
Hirshleifer, J. (1987). On emotions as guarantors of threats and promises. In Dupre J. 
(Ed.) Latest on the Best: Essays on Evolutions and Optimality. Cambridge: 
MIT Press. 
Hopfensitz, A. and E. Reuben (2005). The Importance of Emotions for the 
Effectiveness of Social Punishment. Discussion paper 05-075/1. Tinbergen 
Institute. 
 39
Jakobs, E., A.S.R. Manstead, and A.H. Fischer (1996). Social context and the 
experience of emotion. Journal of Nonverbal Behavior 20: 123-142. 
Jakobs, E., A.S.R. Manstead, and A.H. Fischer (1999). Social motives, emotional 
feelings, and smiling. Cognition and Emotion 13: 321-345. 
Kagel, J.H. and K.W. Wolfe (2001). Tests of fairness models based on equity 
considerations in a three-person ultimatum game. Experimental Economics 4: 
203-219. 
Kirchsteiger, G. (1994). The role of envy in ultimatum games. Journal of Economic 
Behavior and Organization 25: 373-389. 
Knez, M. and C.F. Camerer (1995). Outside options and social comparison in a three-
player ultimatum game experiments. Games and Economic Behavior 10: 65-
94. 
Lazarus, R.S. (1991). Emotion and Adaptation. New York: Oxford University Press. 
Lerner, J.S. and D. Keltner (2000). Beyond valence: Toward a model of emotion-
specific influences on judgment and choice. Cognition and Emotion 14: 473-
492. 
Levine, D. (1998). Modeling altruism and spitefulness in experiments. Review of 
Economic Dynamics 1: 593-622. 
Loewenstein, G.F. (1996). Out of control: Visceral influences on behavior. 
Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes 65: 272-292. 
Loewenstein, G. F. (2000). Emotions in economic theory and economic behavior. 
American Economic Review 90: 426-432. 
Ortony, A., G.L. Clore, and A. Collins (1988). The cognitive structure of emotions. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
Pillutla, M.M. and J.K. Murnighan (1996). Unfairness, anger, and spite: Emotional 
rejections of ultimatum offers. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision 
Processes 68: 208-224. 
Potters, J., M. Sefton, and L. Vesterlund (2005). After you: Endogenous sequencing 
in voluntary contribution games. Journal of Public Economics 89: 1399-1419. 
Quervain, D.J.F., U. Fischbacher, V. Treyer, M. Schellhammer, U. Schnyder, A. 
Buck, and E. Fehr (2004). The neural basis of altruistic punishment. Science 
305: 1254-1258. 
Rabin, M. (1993). Incorporating fairness into game theory and economics. American 
Economic Review 83: 1281-1302. 
 40
Riedl, A. and J. Vyrastekova (2003). Responder behavior in three-person ultimatum 
game experiments. Working paper. University of Amsterdam. 
Rosenblat, T.S. and M.M. Mobius (2004). Getting closer or drifting apart? The 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 119: 971-1009. 
Sanfey, A.G., J.K. Rilling, J.A. Aronson, L.E. Nystrom, and J.D. Cohen (2003). The 
Neural Basis of Economic Decision-Making in the Ultimatum Game. Science 
300: 1755-1758. 
Schelling, T.C. (1978). Micromotives and Macrobehavior. New York: Norton. 
Schwarz, N. (1990). Feelings as information: Informational and motivational 
functions of affective states. In Higgins E.T. and R. Sorrentino (Eds.) 
Handbook of motivation and cognition: Foundations of social behavior. New 
York: Guilford Press. 
Smith, V.L. (1976). Experimental economics: Induced value theory. American 
Economic Review 66: 274-279. 
van Winden, F. (2001). Emotional hazard exemplified by taxation-induced anger. 
KYKLOS 54: 491-506. 
 
 41
